This volume addresses a critical problem in understanding the contemporary historical moment: identifying how large-scale and potentially catastrophic economic, social, and political processes are articulated and negotiated in the practice of everyday life. On the one hand, there is comprehensive evidence that capitalism, technological development, and neoliberal state practices have produced massive rates of change across the globe. On the other hand, advances in the qualitative sciences have produced remarkably fine-grained accounts of social experience that cannot be easily coordinated with the structural determination of collective association. The picture that emerges is paradoxical: one sees both highly nuanced examples of human agency and powerful constraints on any attempt to interfere with system dominance.

Thus, there is need for work that can advance understanding of how systemic change is experienced, negotiated, and perhaps resisted in specific settings that define a society’s capacity for political action. To that end, this volume provides a series of chapters grounded in three principles of analysis: they rethink the concept of political culture, by emphasizing the texture of political action, with respect to understanding the catastrophic dimension of the global social order that is emerging in the twenty-first century.

The focus on political culture involves emphasizing the importance of shared habits of communication, interaction, and display in the constitution of political communities and collective action. “Culture” is itself a contested term, of course, and not taken here as a fixed source of meaning or motivation. Rather, the intention is to consider how political intelligibility, legitimacy, and capacity are constructed and complicated by being articulated through distinctively coherent repertories of social practice. By seeing how political subjectivity grows out of situated conversations in specific localities, flows across the surface of society, becomes embedded in public arts, or is relayed through
digital technologies, one can identify how politics depends on aesthetically inflected concentrations of social energy that in turn suggest varied theory-practice relationships.

The specific focus within this context is on the “texture” of political practices. Politics is understood to be more richly articulated than abstract relations of power, more extensive than governmental practices, and determined not only by necessity and self-interest but also by modes of performance. Although still structured by the constraints and advantages of economic resources, social organization, and other systemic factors, political judgment and action are also the outcomes of finely woven habits of speech, interaction, and artistic display. Although capable of representing structural conditions and coordinating large populations, these patterns are known only through their particularity. Thus, cultural analysis becomes focused on the surface of things—the observable features of social performance as they are embedded in texts and other artifacts—and can consider “horizontal” logics of articulation along with surface-structure relationships (Alexander 2008; Bartmanski and Alexander 2012; Hariman and Lucaites 2014). From this perspective, the relative autonomy of political thought is not necessarily given: instead, the focus is on how political consciousness is being modulated across a spectrum of social and cultural activities, while the ability to control the definition of political action can be crucial.

The commitment to theoretical argument regarding the continuing development of modernity is obviously ambitious and perhaps quixotic, but we believe it is also an intellectual obligation. The contemporary focus and small scale of our work cannot sustain comprehensive claims, but we believe scholars need to address the question of how situated knowledge can contribute to understanding large-scale historical phenomena that are putting considerable pressure on all societies today. These widespread changes include the “creative destruction” of traditional economic and social practices; population displacement and hyperurbanization; cultural hybridization and global system integration; and ecological, economic, and political disasters. Within this context, the chapters in this volume will suggest how the interaction of social structure and individual agency can be identified in the nuanced articulations of situated speech bounded by global predicaments. At the same time, we are attempting to stay abreast of corresponding changes in both academic and public discourses that attempt to track comprehensive change. These shifts in the discursive horizon include globalization, which has expanded from economic reality to civic ideology; hegemony, which may be entering a paradoxical phase that depends on disruption for system maintenance; and catastrophe, which has displaced revolution as a master trope for dramatic change.
This last point is particularly salient. While completing this book, we watched demonstrations in the Ukraine flip in days from a restoration of democratic values to the pretext for Russian conquest of the Crimea. Similar reversals are being cemented into place in Egypt and other sites of the Arab Spring, just as anticolonial revolutions have often led to another order of domination or spasms of predation between warlords battling for resource monopolies. Self-determination has been overrun by international markets in guns, drugs, and human trafficking, as well as other examples of violence going global. Revolutions still exist, but only, it seems, to become examples of how systems of exploitation can reassert themselves. Modernization, liberalization, and other markers of “Western” civilization continue to expand globally, and thus make the geographic label increasingly dated, yet twenty-first-century modernity seems to be defined less and less by a narrative of revolutionary progress, and more by terror attacks, financial crashes, natural disasters, and other catastrophes. In place of revolutionary change, we have restoration of the status quo ante amid the wreckage, and in place of progress, risk management. One might well wonder, who can really change anything?

Although “agency” and “structure” are well-worn concepts within modern scholarship, the problem of their relationship continues to challenge those attempting to comprehend the everyday experience of historical change. By bringing together scholars in anthropology, rhetoric, and other disciplines, this volume provides close readings of specific events, practices, and cultures to identify some of the characteristic constraints and possibilities defining communicative action in the twenty-first century. The volume will not provide a unified system of explanation, but we hope to get closer to the current “pulse” of the lifeworld: a sense that order and disorder have become barely separable, while political agency is to be found less in democratic institutions or social movements, and more in how ordinary people negotiate complex cultural fields that not only are structured by global forces, but also provide small spaces for making a difference.

**Rhetoric, Culture, and Texture**

Rhetoric, considered as the art of amoral manipulation, has long been a defining feature of politics. Whether courtiers or democratic representatives, success seems to come to those who possess more verbal craft than conscience. Politicians of any stripe are considered “moral menials” because of their habits of dissimulation and pandering on behalf of those who hire them (Miller 1997). The study of rhetoric, then, becomes a handbook on beguilement, and
any scholar would rightly avoid becoming contaminated by a mentality that aims for persuasion, even if based on false belief, rather than knowledge.

Fortunately, scholars in many disciplines now understand (more or less explicitly) that this is not the whole story, that “rhetoric” has from the beginning been an essentially contested term, and that the intellectual history of the art covers a much wider range of political and literary phenomena, many of which are essential constituents of any important collective enterprise or cultural practice. Even so, the conventional wisdom remains widely distributed—not least because it is accurate some of the time—and it can seem intuitively valid when dealing with political controversies or dysfunctional polities. Even those familiar with the Rhetoric Culture project might understandably harbor suspicions about the study of political discourse.

Both those who would fault rhetorical skill and those who would praise it agree that it is consequential. If the objection is ethical, it is there only on the assumption that political action can be shaped by verbal performance. If the ethical objection is set aside or countered, that is done on the assumption that the performance has not been adequately described or explained through the conventional account. Of course, political behavior is the result of many other factors as well, including power relations, social hierarchies and networks, geography, wealth, religion, and so forth, and all of these can appear as either fixed conditions or matters of extreme contingency. Because persuasion typically involves the representation and negotiation of such factors, the study of rhetoric should avoid single-bullet explanations. That said, important determinants of the success and failure of entire communities are not likely to be correctly identified or understood without attention to the rhetorical dimension of political action.

The chapters in this volume reflect no commitment to a single definition, theory, or doctrine of rhetoric. Indeed, because of the work of the Rhetoric Culture project, they benefit from being able to jump right into the study of specific cases of discursive action without being encumbered by academic controversies or definitional arguments. The context that enables this work is one that the editors have been a part of for several decades, and I can briefly summarize a few key commitments in that regard. The first is to begin with a capacious and affirmative understanding of rhetoric as the study of how language, images, and other symbolic materials operate as a form of action to secure agreement and other goods necessary for collective association. The interests are analytical, theoretical, and normative: that is, to identify how people communicate for social, political, or cultural effect; to explain why they do so and how their actions affect subsequent actions, policies, or practices; and to assess how choices embedded in communicative artifacts and practices constrain or enable the normative infrastructure for a decent society, not
least its commitments to human rights, justice, compassion, peace, and similar ideals regarding the general welfare. One need not sign on to a given ideology or an exclusively Western worldview, but one does ask how persuasive success or failure serves some conception of human interest.

The second general feature of our approach is to bring together what have often been two separate tracks in the history of rhetoric: the study of rhetoric as a civic art, and the study of rhetoric as an art of literary composition. Both tracks have focused on the close reading of discursive technique, but against very different horizons of meaning, defined by either the political community or the literary tradition, by an emphasis on argument or on style, and by anxieties about ethical malfeasance or anxieties about authorial innovation, among many other such considerations. These have been blended powerfully in the past—Cicero and his Renaissance readers remain leading examples—but in the modern period they have been channeled into different literatures, practices, pedagogies, and disciplines. With the postmodern turn, however, productive integrations have happened on each side. The study of literary composition has acquired a decidedly political orientation, while study of the civic art has included studies of political performance, political aesthetics, and other figural analyses of the composition of political experience. The focus in the Rhetoric Culture project on the role of rhetoric in the emergence of culture is obviously another example of attempting to understand phenomena that are simultaneously aesthetic and political, decorative and consequential. That project draws on a rich tradition in anthropology of studying the use of figuration in the negotiation of difference and conflict within the discourses of ordinary life and in anthropological writing itself (Strecker and Tyler 2009: 1–3, 15–18). Thus, the reflexive conjunction of aesthetic and political mentalities makes the study of rhetoric into a study of culture.

By focusing on such aesthetic variables as genre, form, figuration, narration, gesture, mood, tone, and the like, and on corresponding variables of response and interaction in the coproduction of meaning, one acquires a critical lexicon for getting inside the discursive construction of political experience. Were these merely formalist categories, the work might remain too distant from the pragmatic consequences that define political action, but working within an explicitly rhetorical context links compositional technique and political orientation. Equally important, this focus on the “political aesthetic”—that is, rhetorical—dimension of experience provides a way to work across modernist categorizations that would define politics, society, and culture as largely autonomous fields of behavior covered by separate disciplines of study (Hariman 1995; Ankersmit 1996; Rancière 2004; Brummett 2008; Bleiker 2009; Panagia 2009; Sartwell 2010).

In our project, culture is neither a pervasive ground encompassing all political activity—and therefore often irrelevant to political discriminations—
nor a relatively sophisticated overlay of meaning and reflexivity—and therefore epiphenomenal to relations of power and impositions of force. Instead, “culture” refers to the assemblage of habits, conventions, and meanings that shape communication in any particular realm of interaction (Carey 2009). Culture functions as both context and content for communication: its media, arts, genres, styles, and other patterns provide constraints on and affordances for specific modes of communication, and the conversations, texts, and other interactions that ensue draw on those symbolic materials as sources of invention and identification when forming and relaying message content. Likewise, any given interaction can be under the horizon of a dominant culture, and it can be a point where multiple cultures intersect and vie for influence. Some cultures can be denominated as political cultures—the culture of the Tea Party, the statehouse, and so forth—while others are less explicitly organized around a political nodal point but are politically consequential nonetheless. The analysis of political cultures in this larger sense could include attention to how action coalesces within, for example, neighborhoods, ethnic groups, or states, along with many other practices such as the military, humanitarian, occupational, and entertainment networks that can become arrayed around a controversy. The point is not to define everything as a culture, but rather to use culture as a means for identifying the complexity shaping political action that might be overlooked or undervalued by analysis focused only on explicitly political variables or material conditions.

This attention to political culture also includes an attempt to account for the contingency of political action. Rather than give too much significance to either structural factors or individual agency, the analysis of political culture considers how political decisions are made “in solution,” that is, in gray areas of indeterminacy and maneuver defined by rhetorical conventions that are shared, contested, provisional, and at times inadequate. This is not to deny the value of subsequent explication, but it attempts to understand how important considerations may be experienced only intuitively, indirectly, partially, or under another name and yet be in play nonetheless. Stated otherwise, to the extent that individual or collective agency is available in some objective sense, it will not be used unless it is available within the experience of the political actors, and that experience is always shaped by the context and content of their communicative technologies, habits, interactions, messages, and the like: in short, by the complex interplay of media and meanings that can be labeled the “rhetorical” or “aesthetic” resources of a culture. Thus, the study of political culture is an attempt to discern how actors become equipped for action, how they can use available resources, how effectiveness can depend on timing and other situational or performative skills, how intended actions can have unintended consequences, and similar considerations of how political
scenarios are not wholly legible because they are necessarily collective and radically contingent.

This lack of legibility is no small factor when the stakes are high, as they often are when making political decisions. The importance and difficulty of drawing on experience that is collective, contingent, and tacit has been recognized since Aristotle's discussion of the enthymeme. That term refers to one of the primary forms of inference in public argument, and specifically to deductive inference where one of the premises is supplied by the audience (Sloane 2001: 247–50; Rapp 2010; Poster 2000). This coproduction of meaning and agreement is largely tacit (today polls and focus groups try to tap it). The speaker has to rely on the audience providing what goes without saying, and one of the problems is that a lot goes without saying. Thus, speakers and audiences need to be able to share cues, conventions, and the like: the materials of a culture (Miller and McHoul 1998: 179). Nor are these skills limited to elites, for they are the conditions of communicative competency for everyone in a society, and they can be distributed across all media, speakers, and audiences.

They are not distributed equally, however. The focus on shared cultural resources for political argument is easily taken to be a program for consensus politics, with a corresponding denial of systemic inequity. That may be a characteristic risk of our approach, but it is not an inevitable outcome. Symbolic resources are not distributed equally, as societies are stratified by class and other power relations. Likewise, cultures are not seamless veils of unanimity but instead are riven with differences, many of which are used to maintain regimes of domination and exploitation. Social inscriptions—for example, blue for boys and pink for girls in the maternity ward—are not politically innocent and are harder to resist the more widely distributed they become. Cultural capital, which could be widely empowering, is hoarded by those already possessing wealth, status, and other advantages. Modes of communication across social and cultural divisions then become complexly and deceptively coded, as when the “official transcript” masks what is expressed in the “hidden transcript” of any group’s discourse (Scott 1990). The study of political culture has to include attention to both ideology and resistance, and to both competency and equity.

That said, relations of power are complicated by at least two factors specific to the role that language and culture play in maintaining social order: social ascriptions have to be partially evident on the surface of things; and there have to be some common conventions for communicating (and ruling, and resisting) across social divisions. The differences between in-groups and outsiders, elites and masses, or any other stratification will have to be coded into speech and other cultural materials if they are to be maintained or mobilized. Once coded, they can be manipulated, made an object of scrutiny, ridiculed, and otherwise put at variance with experience. To naturalize convention, dis-
course has to remain conventional; its operations are always subject to critique, whether through scholarly study or the slightest change in expression. And because all groups have to communicate with others, there have to be terms and discourses that can work across (or without) the most parochial social knowledge held by each group. These broader vocabularies become especially important as groups become interdependent and as relationships become unequal: as dominant groups come to depend on fictions of equality, reciprocity, and the like to maintain the social order to their benefit, the negotiation of what is said and its relationship to what goes unsaid becomes particularly important to all sides. Outside of total domination, the terms of political speech need to be ambivalent or ambiguous, which makes both control and resistance depend on variations in use (Edelman 1964, 1971; Scott 1985, 1990; Bailey 1983, 2009). So it is that texture matters.

By texture we mean the manner in which social context is evident on the surface of an event, and how that modulation is one dimension of the overdetermined, performative, and dynamic quality of social experience. Just as material surfaces are rough or smooth, so are social surfaces rich or poor, relaxed or tense, bureaucratic or sentimental, and so forth, and each of these textures carries a history of how it got that way. A frayed hem may be due to poverty or personal inattention to fashion or the “disingenuous mistake” of a high-end designer brand, but it means something. More than usual use of the collective personal pronoun may be due to professional habit, celebrity affectation, or megalomania, but rarely is it accidental. It may be unwitting, of course, in the sense that the social actor is not aware of the variation from the norm or is not calculating its effects, but that is simply evidence that the practice is intensively cultural rather than merely intentional.

In the same way, surfaces in any scene are more or less coordinated or uncoordinated, resonant or dissonant, homologous or dissimilar, and often unconsciously so. By paying attention to the texturing of the communicative environment, one can discern what past conditions and practices have been shaping the scene, and what resources for the composition of experience are available to the actors within the scene. When military officers are in the groove at their habitual early morning meetings while the civilians present are sleep deprived and otherwise disoriented by the time shift from their schedules, that asymmetry is likely to be evident in the small variations in dress, deportment, facial expressions, and other minutia that signal what can be consequential disparities in attention and solidarity. When conservative politicians stage events with music by artists they otherwise would include among the “liberal elite” destroying the values of the “real America,” that seeming incongruity invites analysis in conjunction with other elements of the spectacle that may be evidence of either deeper continuity or a more comprehensive hypocrisy, but in
either case it might provide a key for unlocking some of the puzzlement about contemporary populism. Thus, by attending to the texture of political action, one can perhaps discern how that action is shaped by contextual factors that may not be explicitly stated or explicitly political. These include how various social networks or cultural materials are braided together in a particular moment or movement; how elements necessary for the interpretation of political discourse are evident in the stylistic features of that discourse and the media and other environments affecting reception; how political experience is being shaped by the contingent conjunction of these factors; and how they provide constraints and affordances for other actors and subsequent actions.

These features of political experience can be isolated by application of a variety of methods. Discourse analytics, ethnography, semiotics, rhetoric, iconography—these and other conceptual protocols have made substantial contributions to the analysis of individual agency in materially situated contexts. We do not see the need to provide a brief for any of them. The attention to texture does, however, bend any method away from abstraction and toward a more engaged encounter with particularity. Texture provides an initial suspension of larger conceptions of structural determination; such forces are still present, but not necessarily the prime determinates of action that also can be highly contingent and turn on the smallest things. In Kathleen Stewart’s eloquent statement:

[T]he terms neoliberalism, advanced capitalism, and globalization that index this emergent present and the five or seven or ten characteristics used to summarize and define it in shorthand, do not in themselves begin to describe the situation we find ourselves in. The notion of a totalized system, of which everything is always already somehow a part, is not helpful (to say the least) in the effort to approach a weighted and reeling present. (2007: 1)

What is needed instead is an adaptation of one’s method to become attuned to the nascent potentialities in any situation, and to how any event is the specific activation of some set of connections that could have been (and sometimes still can be) otherwise. Classical rhetoric emphasized the control of probabilities in crafting discourse and judgment, but this modern optic is grounded more in individual subjectivity and a phenomenology of experience: “Modes of attending to scenes and events spawn socialities, identities, dream worlds, bodily states and public feelings of all kinds” (Stewart 2007: 10). Stewart emphasizes how this attentiveness is lodged in ordinary life and yet also capable of becoming a modality for social thought. In each case, one is observing, experiencing, and thinking about resonances and other affective surges and connections. Our conception of texture can aspire to this search for “the potential stored in ordinary things…. Fleeting and amorphous, it lives as a residue or
resonance in an emergent assemblage of disparate forms and realms of life. Yet it can be as palpable as a physical trace” (Stewart 2007: 21). What often is fleeting, of course, is not the artifact or the routinized practice, but the energy that both can and need not flow through that circuit. Structural pressure and surface variation, but also circuit and flow; intention and constraint, but also timing and chance: these and similar configurations are possible developments of any method that is devoted to discerning how action is a precipitate of potentialities, which in turn can involve large forces being channeled or deflected by small things.

Of course, a method devoted to identifying traces and reading signs that can carry multiple meanings, and often in highly constrained media such as official documents, institutional decor, or popular iconography, is fraught with opportunities for error. Were these merely literary exercises, some might not care, but with politics the stakes are high. We note, however, that the problems of the analyst are precisely those encountered by ordinary actors all the time. Scholars or other professionals supply additional requirements for interpretive validity, but there is no higher knowledge that eliminates the basic dilemma of having to act on the basis of incomplete information, conflicting values, and contingent circumstances. Political actors have to be attuned to the texture of their world if they are to draw on the resources for persuasion that their culture provides. And they have to do this when it matters most; ultimately, when they are trying to stave off or contend with disaster.

Catastrophe

One might expect the study of political action to focus at some point on revolution, that is, on the paradigmatic example of radical action and deep change. Given the alignment of revolution with progress and both democratic and socialist ideologies in the modern era, both scholarship and public commentary continue to speak of revolutions in the making, revolutionary causes, or the need to reform lest more revolutionary alternatives become necessary. Even for those not happy about progressive tendencies, revolution has been the epitome of political change and something to be avoided for that reason. Although this framework for organizing or interpreting political action will persist, we believe that it has become unrepresentative of both the conditions and character of political action in the twenty-first century. Revolution no longer captures key elements of political imagination or agency, while it reinscribes a conception of autonomous political action that is increasingly unrealistic in the contemporary economic environment. Moreover, another form of violent upheaval is displacing it as the representative figure of need and mobilization. As revolutions
have become precursors to disappointment (Greenberg 2014)—and, ironically, stories of literal revolution, that is, of change that returns to the same place—catastrope has become a master trope for historical discontinuity.

Curiously, catastrophes can contain many of the features of the revolutionary ideal: a great rupturing of the established order, a sweeping process of change that affects all classes, enhanced solidarity as people create new modes of living together, and emerging awareness of a new horizon of meaning, with all of it exceeding prior practices of prediction and control. This depiction is idealized, of course, but so was the revolutionary model. There are also important differences. Catastrophe—from the Greek *katastrephein*, which is related through the root to the rhetorical term *trope*—features overturning or destructive transformation, but with no fixed intention or end. Catastrophe can also refer in classical drama to the transition from the climax to the conclusion, and so perhaps a moment—an endlessly recurring moment—within the ongoing drama of modernity. That would be the moment when control collapses, fatality is exposed, and humanity can “experience its own annihilation as a supreme aesthetic pleasure” (Benjamin 2008: 42). But that particular staging is not obligatory, and catastrophe has been developing its own iconography, rituals, and distinctive capacity for representation and reflection. Whatever the inflection, catastrophe pitches everyone into a condition of rupture where society’s basic capacity to function is called into question; in that condition, no new social order is provided to replace the ancien régime, inaction does not restore the status quo ante, action is both unusually difficult and absolutely required, and the outcome is not known.

Even this construction can be too dramatic, however. Ultimately, the divergence from revolutionary action comes from moving beyond the cataclysm itself to more extended conditions that can be both more pessimistic and more open to alternative forms of political agency. Walter Benjamin hinted at this predicament when he said, “Catastrophe—to have missed the opportunity. Critical moment—the status quo threatens to be preserved” (1999: 474). He was seeing catastrophe through the lens of revolution, which could come only by seizing the opportunity provided by the crisis, but his insight goes well beyond the revolutionary attitude or his historical moment. Catastrophes are often experienced as sudden occurrences, but they can develop slowly, can be maintained indefinitely, and can operate in conjunction with the social order even as they destabilize it. So it is that concepts such as “slow violence” or the “regime-made disaster” have emerged to describe the production of catastrophic economic and political regimes, while celebrations of successful environmental reclamation efforts and more efficient energy production can become part of the texture of a civilization refusing to rein in its characteristic hubris (Nixon 2011; Azoulay 2012, 2013).
Thus, catastrophe is emerging as a representative rhetorical figure for twenty-first-century social thought. One sign of the shift in attitude is the enormous popularity of postapocalyptic narratives in television, film, and video games and in science fiction, fantasy, and gothic genres in any medium (Clarke 2005; Paik 2010). Whether in popular culture or public discourse, the trope describes crucial features of the risks, costs, and defining events of global modernization, and it provides a nodal point for thinking about processes of change and collective organization in that world. That engagement with modernity includes refiguration of the era’s central myth of progress. That myth imagined inevitable improvement driven by Enlightenment mentalities in every sphere of human endeavor, albeit with some need for occasional revolutions in politics, society, the arts, and even science. Indeed, modernity was a revolutionary project, wresting itself out of the feudal order and advancing through perpetual revolutions (the Protestant revolution, the Darwinian revolution, the Russian Revolution, etc.). The catastrophic model comes without that teleology: progress can occur, but the processes of modernization can also lead to disaster and decline. Thus, catastrophe is not limited to the occurrence of unexpected and unintended negative outcomes, but rather extends to those breakdowns that expose the fragility and teleological vacuity of modern economic, technological, and political systems. As Peter Sloterdijk has observed, “[M]odernity is losing, in addition to its feeling of vitality, the distinction between crisis and stability” (1987: 124). (The claim about vitality would seem to be patently mistaken, but consider that it might include the sense that modernity cannot deliver on its promises, that it can no longer ward off its negative consequences, that it is losing control of development on its own terms, or that it cannot be renewed and extended via revolutions. More to the point, it might suggest that the apparent signs of vitality—heightened market activity and the busyness and acceleration of everyday life—are but frenetic distractions from an underlying cynicism.) As modern technologies and economic practices achieve system dominance, catastrophe shifts from being a frontier phenomenon (the loss of an army or an astronaut) to becoming embedded in the constitution of modern civilization as it can be found anywhere, such as in the “normal accidents” of a “risk society” (Beck 1992; Perrow 1999; Davis 1999; Larabee 2000; Posner 2004; Sarat and Lezaun 2009; Wright 2004). For example, one might consider how modern societies have bought into “modernity’s gamble,” the wager that the disastrous consequences of modern technology use can be avoided through additional innovation (Hariman and Lucaites 2007: 244). It is not an obviously bad bet, and that is where the smart money is in the near term, but the important point is that it is a bet. Modernity is no longer a narrative of the continuing mastery of nature, but rather a social order organized around a dangerous form of deep play.
This volume brings these and other variations on the trope of catastrophe to bear in several ways. The primary focus is on examining how the experience of catastrophe informs the lives of ordinary people, and more specifically how it textures the actions that they take to try to cope with conditions of economic and political instability. Thus, ongoing economic disruptions and deprivations can make ordinary life closer to the aftermath of a natural disaster than either traditional rural or affluent urban social experience, and political action can be thwarted by all manner of system breakdowns while also being affected in various directions by external interventions that are closer to disaster relief than they are to serious investments in community sustainability. As bubbles burst, states fail, humanitarian interventions assist regimes of domination, modernization projects doom traditional communities, global markets escalate income inequity both within and between societies, and the environmental costs of affluence rise ominously, more and more people are coping with the paradoxical condition of normal system operation becoming indistinguishable from system breakdown. And typically they are coping with remarkable creativity and resilience (Birkland 2009: 125–28; Solnit 2009), though not often to overcome much larger structural deficits and betrayals—the larger catastrophes revealed by seemingly local disasters.

At the last, however, we return to a more general level of theoretical argument, tracing the history and implications of the shift from revolution to catastrophe as a master trope in social thought. The result is not another grand theory, but rather a cautionary note. Perhaps the requirement for a progressive response to a catastrophic modernity is to imagine a politics that is less dramatic than the revolutionary ethos, but more radical for that. If so, the key may be to see how the gaps in system control are to be found in the little things, that is, by being more attentive to the complex and perhaps unexpected relationships between large but unstable structures and the texture of those small places that can be changed for the better.

The Case Studies

The case studies in this volume are not defined by a common disciplinary orientation, theoretical argument, topic, or method. For example, some of the authors do ethnographic research and focus on face-to-face interaction, while others examine political or commercial advertising to provide critical interpretations of those public texts. Some follow the protocols of conversational discourse analysis, some examine metaphor, irony, or other techniques from the lexicon of rhetorical study, some draw on Bakhtin or other literary theorists, some emphasize historical and philosophical contextualizations, and
many draw on several of these approaches. Each of the chapters provides a
distinctive configuration of context, theory, and method to address a shared
preoccupation with the themes of political culture, texture, and catastrophe.
As we hope to show through the diversity and range of these case studies, these
concepts provide important challenges and resources for the continued devel-
opment and relevance of the human sciences.

The first chapter foregrounds a number of factors that are evident across
the volume. Hungarian public discourse exemplifies many of the liminal char-
acteristics of a political culture at the borders between national identity and
imperial hegemony, between a violent past and unstable present, and between
democratization and the crosscurrents of populism and liberalization. Within
this context, David Boromisza-Habashi features a more fundamental liminal-
ity within public speech itself: the process by which a public expression be-
comes a political expression. The liberal democratic public sphere is one where
it seems just about anything can move from being “nonpolitical” (a simple
commercial advertisement, for example) to “political” (say, an ad that offends a
minority) and back again. By focusing on the topic of hate speech, Boromisza-
Habashi looks at one area of public discourse where the stakes are very high—
indeed, where the question in Hungary is whether the polity can prevent an
“impending social catastrophe.” Through an “ethnorhetorical” analysis of
several speech genres, the study identifies a specific technique for texturing
public discourse: by constructing an explicit dilemma, the interlocutors can
both shift from public to political speech and articulate a common resource
for conflict resolution.

Macedonia provides another example of a political community defined
by difficult questions of transformation. Following independence in 1991, the
country has been contending with the challenges of national state formation,
economic transformation from socialism to capitalism, war on its northern
border, political conflict with Greece, and violent ethnic insurgencies. This
complexity is reflected in the many different discourses of private life, busi-
ness, government, media coverage, and so forth. Andrew Graan attempts to
identify how public discourse addresses these problems in a manner that con-
 structs political experience and enables or disables a sense of individual agency.
Graan draws on Mikhail Bakhtin’s theory of the chronotope, which marks
how discursive genres can direct narrative composition according to specific
ideological paths; thus, any coherent configuration of time and place can carry
with it conceptions of character, relationships, and action that make specific
responses more or less available, intelligible, and legitimate. Graan focuses
on two chronotopes in Macedonian discourse, signified by the terms “transi-
tion” and “Europe.” By charting these terms across several controversies and
through different media, Graan shows how the two chronotopes provide con-
trasting visions of the nation and contrasting attitudes toward political action. Equally important, he demonstrates how they involve reciprocal interaction between media performances and everyday experience. Through analysis of these “orienting devices” in public discourse, one can understand how political culture acquires a specific texture that can shape subjective experience and political praxis.

Macedonia’s problems might seem small to those elsewhere in the Balkans, and Naser Miftari’s synopsis of political culture in Kosovo reflects a more pessimistic assessment of the possibilities for democratic sustainability. By looking beyond the impression management of public scandals for the basic “scripts” for elite political transactions, Miftari identifies a habit of discursive vagueness that allows near-term trade-offs between contending parties that set the polity on the path to becoming a failed state. Rhetorics of change thus become part of the ritual repetition of established power relationships, and rhetorics of democratization become the lingua franca for external management by international organizations. Nor are these developments unique to Kosovo, as Miftari argues that they stem from endemic problems of the “in-between states.” Because modern democratic concepts of rights and transparency are fundamentally abstract, enactment and uptake requires drawing on the deep social networks that preceded democratization and often resist it; indeed, democratic sustainability requires relying on the social and cultural habits that it intends to change, and not surprisingly often without success. The same texturing of democratic practices that is necessary for their uptake in everyday life plays into the hands of political elites, who then thwart political transition while hijacking economic development. To avoid the pending catastrophe for the nation, it appears that one has to look past institution building to see how the social fabric is already being reappropriated to empower some and sideline many others.

One might expect that public discourse in larger and more established states would be less provisional or more uniform than in a small state fraught with transition, but every nation is caught within processes of change today, and public discourse in the United States has hardly been a model of rational deliberation. The Occupy Wall Street movement brought these tensions to a head, as it confronted a profound economic transformation that is reshaping American society, and did so in a manner that was intentionally not legible according to the conventions of political advocacy. A movement without apparent leaders, doctrines, goals, or policy proposals, and one that seemed much more interested in talking to itself than to the press or the political establishment, Occupy was easily dismissed as odd and ineffectual. Yet, it changed the agenda of political debate and remains a leading example of radical praxis. Robert Danisch explains how the movement becomes legible once it is seen
in the context of American pragmatism. This legibility comes not from a gloss of political philosophy, however, but from seeing how the fine-grained communication practices of the group enacted a specific form of “rhetorical citizenship.” This mode of public discourse attempts to embody egalitarian social democracy through specific communication practices that extend the social contract beyond rights to ground citizenship in collective participation and solidarity. Thus, the key to understanding Occupy is to see how the participants textured public communication according to protocols such as speaking order, audience hand signals, and other techniques designed to create a social democratic political culture.

Occupy has since moved on, and that is not surprising. As with many other social movements today, it is difficult to measure the character and influence of the movement according to conventional metrics of either progressive politics or social movement theory. Peter N. Funke and Todd Wolfson set out an argument that can explain this shift in movement strategies while providing tools for close analysis of specific organizational efforts or demonstrations. The chapter goes beyond the Occupy movement’s focus on the income gap to address the more comprehensive framework of neoliberal capitalism. This economic transformation provides not only the object for democratic protests but also the structural conditions that motivate changes in progressive organization and advocacy. As logics of capital accumulation combine with information and communication technologies, progressives have become increasingly nomadic. This nomadic culture is articulated along three dimensions: a flattening of forms in organizational structure; a flattening of fronts by incorporating diverse struggles and groups; and a flattening of governance that emphasizes grassroots and consensual decision making. Thus, even if movement ideals may be relatively unchanged over time, the contemporary movements have a texture that differs from previous generations of Left activism—and raises objections across generational lines. Funke and Wolfson see the wisdom on each side, and argue that just as the new political culture is an important adaptation for confronting neoliberal capitalism, it is also hampered by that relationship and could benefit from reflection on its limitations in respect to earlier movement strategies.

This emphasis on adaptation to neoliberal political and economic policies is continued in Catherine Fennell’s study of negotiations over heat within low-income communities in Chicago. Public housing projects, which had been a fixture in modern urban social welfare policy, have been destroyed and replaced with subsidized dispersion into the apartments and other dwellings available in the housing market. Whatever the problems with the “projects,” former residents fondly recall the high levels of heat that were a constant comfort during Chicago winters. By contrast, now the low-income renter has to
provide enough heat to sustain the familial and social housing patterns that were also part of life in the projects, but with subsidies that fail to anticipate actual costs. Subsequent negotiations over heat with family, friends, landlords, and officials become part of a new fabric of life, one that both distributes risk downward while interfering with individuals’ capacity to care for others who are also struggling with poverty. Just as the projects were the subject of complicated and polarized reactions, Fennell identifies a number of ideological, administrative, and political considerations that converge in the politics of market-oriented reform. Her account is distinguished by emphasis on the political texturing of the sensorium, and her suggestions for a sensory politics allow one to more keenly identify both “intensifying fields of physical and social risk” and alternate conceptions of citizenship.

This attention to sensory experience and everyday obligations as they can infuse political action is continued in Eleftheria J. Lekakis’s study of the rhetoric of fair trade coffee consumption. By examination of the narratives, allegories, and metaphors of online publicity for fair trade practices, Lekakis tracks how a political culture is created and deployed. Once within that culture, consumption becomes a specifically textured form of political action. Contrary to some arguments for both economic justice and unfettered free markets, this culture is not one where fair trade and free trade are opposing practices; instead, they are woven together, and the results can include both a strong call for justice and a strong market dependency. As with other chapters, this analysis of fair trade rhetoric demonstrates how one’s sense of political participation and agency can be shaped by fine-grained interactions between media production and everyday life. Similarly, it provides another example of how the discursive tactics for progressive advocacy are shaped by the historical transformations it would resist, and how the choice for contemporary activists is often one of learning how to ride the tiger that would devour them.

The attempt to create equitable, sustainable relationships between local practices and larger processes of economic and political transformation becomes especially fraught when the encounter is between indigenous societies and top-down state modernization. As James C. Scott (2009) has demonstrated, when the state has been relatively weak and the geography conducive to escape strategies, traditional societies have been able to preserve an acceptable level of autonomy. Felix Girke thickens that idea with his study of the Kara people of southern Ethiopia. The Kara’s relationship with the Ethiopian government includes ritualized negotiations constituting a political culture that is dysfunctional by some measures yet also characterized by highly sophisticated performances that allow the Kara to maintain their dignity. By attending to the texture of those ritualized encounters between state officials and Kara speak-
ers, and particularly to the adroit use of irony and other performative tactics, Girke is able to identify important values, practices, and strategies for sustaining the political relationships that protect the Kara. Even so, Girke is equally attentive to the fact that this “peripheral wisdom” may finally be conquered by the forces of economic development: construction of a dam that would end the annual flooding necessary for Kara agriculture, which would then leave them with the prospect of either resettlement or becoming low-wage laborers for the plantations already plotted across their territory. This catastrophe is not one that their rhetorical skills can confront head-on, even as it presents the ultimate test, though not a fair one, for their political culture.

This predicament is not unique, nor does it exhaust the discursive resources for coping. Christian Meyer examines another community’s response to disaster, in this case a locust plague that devastated the fields of the Wolof people in northwestern Senegal. As Meyer notes, disasters are now a regular feature of the global discourse of modernization. Although an embarrassment because of how they reveal the incompleteness or fragility of modernity, disasters also prompt mobilization across multiple networks, state intervention to manage the situation and provide aid, and, not incidentally, a lot of talk about what is to be done. Meyer provides a fine-grained analysis of conversation among the villagers directly affected by the plague, and finds strong correspondences between a global discourse of disaster management and the local conversations about the locust’s encroachment, the responses of local actors and the state, and related concerns. The Wolof employ sequenced functions of disaster communication, topoi of risk assessment, figural representations, and more contentious claims of social inequality that can lead to political action. Thus, Meyer finds that the local and global discourses of disaster management both intersect and diverge. The political culture that is evident in the villagers’ response to catastrophe is one that can be legible to global organizations and institutional actors, while remaining focused on finding opportunities for local control and sustainability.

It might seem odd to some that the Wolof do not have a term for disaster; as this volume suggests, that category (of disaster or catastrophe) is becoming increasingly salient in the global discourse of modernity. Even with that category, however, problems of representation remain. Indeed, one predicament in capital- and technology-intensive societies is not being able to mark the “everyday catastrophes” that result from excessive consumption. Resource depletions, toxin accumulations, species die-offs, antibiotic-resistant pathogens, public health problems such as obesity and type 2 diabetes, more and more social energy diverted to buying, storing, discarding, and recycling consumer goods—these and other conditions are signs of overconsumption, yet the lived experience of the relevant economic and social practices is often one
of convenience, short-term gratification, novelty, or other simple pleasures. To address this problem, Monica Westin examines Thomas Hirschhorn’s artwork *Too Too Much Much*. Hirschhorn’s installation consists of many thousands of aluminum beverage cans piled up through the museum space and flowing out the door like a glacier of trash. By confronting the spectator with an experience of scale that usually is invisible, the work also evokes an aesthetic uniquely suited to the representation of rupture and excess: the sublime. This aesthetic experience is also suited to understanding catastrophe, and so Hirschhorn is able to transform the everyday world of consumer consumption into an ongoing disaster in the making. Westin takes this provocation further still by focusing on material embodiment of what are otherwise abstractions. The encounter with the texture of excess gives excess a rhetorical presence that shifts from logics of symbolic representation to political interpellation. In short, we are called to be subjects who already have been making a mess of the world.

The artist’s attempt to confront large-scale economic processes is complemented by the Conclusion’s return to social theory, as Ralph Cintron examines the intertwined histories of revolutionary and catastrophic mentalities. Modern economics in particular has been unusually receptive to concepts of rupture, and a political aesthetic of revolution energized both Left and Right ideologies of political economy. With the rise of neoliberalism as both revanchist ideology and global policy, another rupture has occurred, this time in the notion of disruption itself. By incorporating catastrophic change into the successful operation of capital, the logic of civilizational development has been redefined in a way that undercuts prior practices of critique and mobilization. The exhaustion of the Left as the engine of progressive social change is one symptom of that shift; another is the paradoxical capability of the Right to reframe system breakdown as a basis for reinvestment in destructive economic practices. Cintron concludes where we began, by suggesting that local political actors are not helpless in this condition, if they can become more attentive to the discursive possibilities for re-creating culture and community in a world that is defined as much by paradox as by progress. If modernity is to be both just and sustainable, those who have the capability to act must be willing to accept not only that ruins can be transformed into gleaming monuments to progress, but also that progress is already in ruins.

**Coda: Political Action among the Ruins**

Catastrophe can be a resource for rethinking the relationship between structural determination and individual agency. On the one hand, system break-
down should create new possibilities for action. The shattered cityscape is also a place of social fissures and emptied spaces now open to new possibilities—in more than one blockbuster movie and perhaps elsewhere as well. On the other hand, a much more comprehensive disaster might be underway: as modern societies are torqued by large-scale forces, the intermediate spaces and shared contexts that sustain democratic politics are slowly being obliterated. As Sloterdijk suggests, when that happens individual subjectivity and social effectiveness become dangerously disjointed.

The present-day servant of the system can very well do with the right hand what the left hand never allowed. By day, colonizer, at night colonized; by occupation, valorizer and administrator, during leisure time, valorized and administered; officially a cynical functionary, privately a sensitive soul; at the office a giver of orders, ideologically a discussant; outwardly a follower of the reality principle, inwardly a subject oriented toward pleasure; functionally an agent of capital, intentionally a democrat; with respect to the system a functionary of reification, with respect to the Lebenswelt (lifeworld), someone who achieves self-realization; objectively a strategist of destruction, subjectively a pacifist; basically someone who triggers catastrophes, in one’s own view, innocence personified. (1987: 113)

Sloterdijk is identifying a deep fissure between functional roles and private consciousness, with nothing like an emergent, intermediate mentality—call it political, public, civic, or something else—to mediate between self and system, much less society and the state. When the public realm disintegrates, one gets this neoliberal conjunction of two forms of the private sphere—corporations and corporatist states on the one side and personal life on the other—and the power imbalance and split subjectivity that comes with that. This “schizoid” condition reflects fundamental contradictions between modernity’s development as a global system of wealth production and its promises of freedom, self-determination, and happiness. In Sloterdijk’s account, the challenge is to overcome the inevitable result of this ongoing catastrophe, which is the pervasive cynicism that is, after all, a rational response to a system that is both dominant and producing the disasters it is supposed to prevent.

In other words, both politics and social theory now lie athwart an ongoing catastrophe. This volume suggests one response to that predicament: if anyone is to bridge the widening chasm between individual agency and large-scale destructiveness, they must become attuned to more varied, provisional, and vernacular forms of communication and culture. As we have suggested, this is where forms of adaptation, resistance, and renewal are being worked out, however fitfully, and where attention to the texture of political action might be-
come particularly helpful. Texture is important in part precisely because of the changes that Jürgen Habermas has identified in the public sphere, including such factors as the rise of consumer consumption, democratic institutionalization, and the “wildness” of noninstitutional speech (Habermas 1989, 1996). Given the pluralism, hybridity, and unchecked circulation characterizing public discourse today, as well as the varied contexts for reception, the room to move toward solidarity and effective critique is often found in the small spaces opened up by seemingly trivial variations in social performance. These spaces can be found within glittering office towers and traditional social practices, and they can include doors to more equitable relationships within existing structures, but also to alternative modernities (Gaonkar 2001).

These are also the conditions Soterdijk identifies as a “life philosophy of crisis”: “moderation of expectations, adaptability, presence of mind, attention to what the moment offers,” and a “current of warmth” that includes “principled hope” and “creative friendliness toward life” (1987: 123, 126). His attitude is melancholic (with an allegorical method to match), but there is no need to settle there. In our account, ruin is not the end point of the Enlightenment narrative, but rather a paradoxical concomitant to progress that is always present, whether as an actual disaster or potential collapse. Like a doppelgänger that can limn distant or future events, catastrophe shadows modernity, and by discerning how this paradoxical condition is woven into everyday life, one can perhaps discern which way the balance is shifting. Of course, this paradoxical condition applies across the board, and no one is exempt from creating unintended consequences. One result might be that action itself has to be cut down a notch, say, by being linked with modes of patience and reflexivity that can be found within the disaster (Blanchot 1986), or by becoming attuned to solidarities that can be found in both small acts of acknowledgment (Stewart 2007) and modes of spectatorship (Azoulay 2008). If dramatic action and endless innovation on behalf of progress are now tarnished dreams, one need not succumb to merely surviving among the ruins. Political imagination, shared responsibility, public accountability, the common good—these and other elements of a just and sustainable political culture are renewable resources.

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eral disciplines, and his work has been translated into French and Chinese. He and coauthor John Louis Lucaites post regularly at nocaptionneeded.com, their blog on photojournalism, politics, and culture.

Bibliography


