Rhetoric, culture and names

by Maurizio Gnerre

Many years ago Edmund Leach (1967) wrote: “If we are to understand what the kinship terms may mean, we must examine the non-kinship words as well”. In this paper I will assume a similar perspective on proper (person) names.
If we try to understand how proper names are used, we must take into account all the forms they are in rhetorical “competition” with, in addressing and referring. The use of a proper names is seen, therefore, as a rhetoric strategy, chosen by the speaker for establishing or maintaining reference, and for enhancing the efficacy of her speech act. The appropriate use of address and reference terms holds a central position in our abilities of an effective use of language.
The questions put in this paper are: which other forms are in rhetorical competition” against proper names and/or can rhetorically “complement” them? What does their use/choice reveal about the social and linguistic negotiation and construction of the speaker and of the addressee identities? How does their use contribute to reach the most adeguate, or appropriate, discoursive effect?
While answering to these questions, I use the concept of social deixis to cover the entire range of means by which we can address, and refer to, other human beings. People both talk to and about people.
Some arguments are provided, however, to claim that the distinction between addressing and referring should not be understood ad a clear-cut dichotomy. The actual and “rhetorical” use of names is discussed as part of a set of Italian address and reference terms, where proper names represent only part of the total number of those terms. From this example it becomes clear that proper names, as part of a range of actually used address terms, occupy a relatively high position in a addressing/referring hierarchy: if somebody (she) can address somebody else (he) using (one of his) proper names, then she can also address him using a form in which a proper name is not included (such as a pronoun, a title, or a kin term). The opposite usually does not hold.
In the second part of the paper I focus on one dimension of social deixis, as it shows in a communicative act - that of “introducing” somebody to somebody else. In this act both addressing and referring are constitutive. An introduction is a “triadic” speech act which, as such, carries some similarities with the central formulaic act necessarily produced in a wedding ceremony. In both acts, referring follows immediately addressing. (“Mary, this is John”). In terms of rhetoric and social deixis, however, there are big differences between the two acts, as wedding is performed using a pre-fixed formula, where the given (and family) names of the bride and the bridegroom must be used, while in introducing two persons the speaker has in many cases some chances to choose the forms (usually names, titles or nicknames) of both the addressee and of the introduced (referred to) person.
On the other hand, the act of “introducing” carries some similarities with the baptismal act which, differently from a wedding, is not triadic but, similarly to an introduction, is part of a “chain” of similar acts. Both acts, in very different ways, play a role of putting somebody into a new discoursive (addressing and referring) perspective. It is like calling somebody to a new, and slightly redefined social identity. The persons being introduced are aware of the social identity of the introducer and of way in which she performed the act (for instance, which name or title she used to refer to each one of them). These considerations lead to observe that the use of specific address and reference terms, carries with it an intrinsic diachrony.